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Abstract
This article evaluates the notion of an ASEAN Security Community. ASEAN’s 
community building initiative is examined in the context of regional, sub-
r egional, and national policy strategies to address a shared regional threat of 
transnational terrorism. The article examines under which circumstances con-
structivist norms and institutions generate denser networks of cooperation.
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Introduction
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) 
ninth summit in Bali in 2003 marked a signifi cant event in the organiza-
tion’s history when political leaders called for the creation of an ASEAN 
Security Community (ASC) by the year 2020. The ASC plan aims for a re-
gion where intra-state and transnational security concerns are resolved 
peacefully through diplomatic processes of dialogue and consensus. Ne-
gotiated settlements would rest upon adherence to ASEAN norms of re-
spect for state sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of 
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neighboring states. An ASC therefore will assume a form of collective iden-
tity and pursue collective aims via dense networks of security cooperation 
among regional states.
In the dominant academic view,1 ASEAN represents a primary example 
of an emerging security community in international relations. The organi-
zation expanded its membership throughout the 1990s to include the for-
mer pariah states of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar, illustrating 
a growing sense of political community in Southeast Asia. It can also be ar-
gued that these states were socialized into the ASEAN grouping. ASEAN 
norms, moreover, permit the management of intra-ASEAN territorial dis-
putes like that over the Spratlys and Litigan and Sipadan Islands2 without 
resorting to military force. As Amitav Acharya notes, ASEAN is a nascent 
security community that relies upon its normative process of consensus 
building and respect for state sovereignty to manage disputes.3 Meanwhile, 
its leadership in the ASEAN Regional Forum is intended to instill confi -
dence in regional security among the larger Asia-Pacifi c powers, represent-
ing an institutional conception of international normative cooperation.
By contrast, other scholars assert that ASEAN is institutionally weak 
and continues to be characterized by an intergovernmental process of co-
operation.4 ASEAN has been criticized for its inability to resolve disputes 
permanently and its plethora of meetings that result in limited concrete 
action. Indeed, ASEAN’s ambition of community building comes at a time 
when its reputation has been diminished by its ineffectiveness during three 
crises, the Asian fi nancial crisis in 1997, the haze pollution that blanketed 
parts of Indonesia and its neighbors during 1997–98 and 2006, and the 
East Timor crisis in 1999. Meanwhile, the association’s engagement with 
the authoritarian regime in Myanmar has tested its credibility. Paradoxi-
cally, its norm of non-interference contradicts regional integration initia-
tives, refl ecting a state-centric approach to foreign policy behavior.
The emergence of a security community relies on the political institu-
tions of a regional group of states. Karl Deutsch, the pioneer of security 
1. Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and 
the Problem of Regional Order (London: Routledge, 2001); Estrella Solidum, The Politics of 
ASEAN: An Introduction to Southeast Asian Regionalism (Singapore: Eastern Universities 
Press, 2003).
2. ASEAN has issued a non-binding code of conduct for claimants to the various Spratly 
Islands, South China Sea. Some of the disputed islands contain large oil and fi shery 
reserves.
3. Acharya, Constructing a Security Community.
4. Michael Leifer, “The ASEAN Peace Process: A Category Mistake,” Pacifi c Review 12:1 
(March 1999), pp. 25–38; David Martin Jones and Mike L. Smith, “The Changing Security 
Agenda in Southeast Asia: Globalization, New Terror, and the Delusions of Regionalism,” 
Studies in Confl ict and Terrorism 24:4 (July 2001), pp. 271–88.
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community theory, describes norms, values, and functioning political in-
stitutions as constituting a pluralistic security community. Interaction and 
transactions (economic, social, and political) among states cultivate com-
munal feelings and engender a shared sense of “we-ness.”
Deutsch’s conceptual framework was later refi ned by two contemporary 
scholars, Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett. Subsequently, Adler and 
Barnett described security communities as evolutionary.5 In the security 
community’s nascent form, states establish relationships to enhance their 
own national security. In the community’s ascendant stage, ties deepen 
through institutions and organizations, in turn giving rise to a sense of 
trust. In its mature stage, regional actors come to share an identity and 
can entertain dependable expectations of peaceful change. Adler and Bar-
nett consequently emphasize institutions, values, and a shared understand-
ing as integral to the process. Ultimately, Deutsch’s notion of “we-ness” 
takes the form of a shared identity. Acharya considers norms, institutions, 
identity, and political processes of socialization as central to the forma-
tion of any security community. From this perspective, ASEAN norms of 
non-interference and respect for state sovereignty have contained inter-
state confl icts like the Malaysia-Philippine dispute over Sabah that might 
have otherwise led to war.
For Acharya, like Deutsch, Adler, and Barnett, a security community is 
built upon a set of dynamics—primarily security interaction through pro-
cesses of socialization guided by an accepted standard of behavioral norms. 
States are drawn into an arrangement that identifi es common threats to 
regional security and responds to them as a collective entity. Members of 
such a community will not go to war with one another but will settle their 
disputes in a peaceful manner.
This notion of  a security community assumes that institutions shape 
state behavior through normative processes that ultimately transform a 
state’s understanding of its role in a regional environment. This form of 
interaction emphasizes norms as socially constructing state perceptions, 
and thus behavior, in an international environment.
Therefore, security community theory describes the conditions upon 
which a security community emerges but fails to explain specifi cally the 
causal links in its political transactions. In the case of  Adler and Bar-
nett, the theory fails to explain how precisely cooperation can transform 
states through the different stages of a security community.6 Meanwhile, 
5. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998).
6. John Garofano, “Power, Institutions, and the ASEAN Regional Forum: A Security 
Community for Asia?” Asian Survey 42:3 (May/June 2002), p. 506.
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the theoretical conditions lack a specifi c set of measurements to discern 
whether norms generate cooperation in an emerging pluralistic security 
community.
Consequently, the application of security community theory to interna-
tional relations requires testing against grounded variables. The literature 
contains a lacuna on how to defi ne and measure the conditions upon which 
a grouping of states exhibits norm compliance. A standard criterion mea-
suring dense transactions, communal feelings, and the effect norms have 
upon state behavior is required to draw stronger conclusions regarding the 
possibility of transforming state behavior within an emerging normative 
community.
In order to address this defi cit in security community building, this paper 
will seek to test Southeast Asia’s evolution toward a security commu -
nity against a common set of indicators. The article therefore will explore 
whether the threat of terrorism in Southeast Asia has galvanized counter-
terrorism cooperation in a manner that refl ects denser ASEAN security 
cooperation that gives substance to ASEAN’s claim to be an emerging se-
curity community. Southeast Asia may be gauged in security community 
terms in three ways: (1) the density of inter-ASEAN security and political 
interaction resulting from multilateral cooperation; (2) a sense of unity and 
“we-ness” illustrated in public speeches, statements, offi cial documents, 
declarations, meetings, and multilateral cooperation; and (3) the extent to 
which ASEAN norms have enhanced cooperation that is measured through 
changes in policy in a manner that improves regional cooperation.7 These 
measurements are based upon John Garofano’s assessment of the need for 
further research into security community theory.
In this context, ASEAN counter-terror policy represents an obvious case 
study to evaluate how institutions and norms may shape the evolution of 
a nascent security community. The transnational nature of regional ter-
rorist groups like Jemaah Islamiah (JI, or Islamic Community), poses a di-
rect security threat to most Southeast Asian states and tests ASEAN’s 
ability to engender deeper cooperation.
If  ASEAN can show via its response to terrorism that denser notions of 
security cooperation have evolved, this would demonstrate clear evidence 
of community building. However, if  ASEAN shows merely rhetorical com-
mitment and a practice that remains essentially bilateral, this would indi-
cate that community building is stalled. This paper will thus interrogate 
counter-terror policies in Southeast Asia at the regional, sub-regional, and 
state levels.
7. Ibid., pp. 508–10.
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Southeast Asian Regional 
Counter-Terrorism Cooperation
Cooperation at the ASEAN Level
In terms of security community building, Acharya, and Adler and Barnett 
all argue that an institution’s norms must engender dense security cooper-
ation and feelings of “we-ness” among its member states. Declarations and 
documents outlining plans of action are clearly important in codifying the 
commitment of Southeast Asian countries in fi ghting terrorism. Following 
the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, ASEAN responded with the Dec-
laration on Joint Action to Counter-Terrorism, which has become the cor-
nerstone for ASEAN’s international counter-terror policies. The declaration 
condemned the September 11 attacks and called for the ASEAN member 
countries to review and strengthen national mechanisms to combat ter-
rorism; deepen cooperation in the areas of intelligence sharing and law en-
forcement; and develop regional capacity building programs to enhance 
the capabilities of member countries to investigate, detect, monitor, and 
report terrorist activities. The declaration reiterated ASEAN’s fundamen-
tal principle of non-interference, stating that all cooperative efforts to 
combat terrorism were to be in line with “specifi c circumstances in the re-
gion and each member country.”8
Following the October 12, 2002, Bali bombings, ASEAN issued a Decla-
ration on Terrorism at the Eighth ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh that con-
demned the “heinous terrorist attacks.”9 The declaration reiterated ASEAN’s 
commitment to fi ghting terrorism through enhanced collective and indi-
vidual cooperation to prevent and suppress terrorist operations. It further 
called for the international community to avoid indiscriminately advising 
their citizens not to visit Southeast Asian countries, advice that had harmed 
business confi dence in the region.10 The declaration, however, did not out-
line concrete forms of action. It was merely a declaration of intent. The dec-
laration called for the establishment of a regional counter-terrorism center 
in Kuala Lumpur. Yet, the Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counter-
Terrorism (SEARCCT), which opened in late 2003, is neither involved in 
regional operations nor serves as an intelligence collection agency. In fact, 
its main responsibility is to organize conferences, seminars, workshops, and 
training courses.
8. ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, Bandar Seri Begawan, Bru-
nei, November 5, 2001, <http:www.aseansec.org/5620.htm>.
9. Declaration on Terrorism by the 8th ASEAN Summit, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, No-
vember 3, 2002, <http://www.aseansec.org/13154.htm>.
10. Ibid.
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These declarations notwithstanding, ASEAN has taken on some 
c apacity-building activities to strengthen regional counter-terrorism ef-
forts. An ASEAN Workshop on Combating International Terrorism was 
held in January 2003 in Jakarta, and the ASEAN Workshop on Counter-
Terrorism in August 2003 was hosted by Kuala Lumpur.11 Singapore has 
played a central role, actively hosting a Workshop on Counter-Terrorism 
—Managing Civil Aviation Security in Turbulent Times in July 2003; the 
ASEANAPOL (ASEAN Chiefs of National Police) Counter-Terrorism 
Workshop on Intelligence Analysis in September 2003; the ASEANAPOL 
Counter-Terrorism Workshop on Post-Bali Investigation in February 2004; 
as well as the ASEANAPOL Counter-Terrorism Workshop on Counter-
measures for Explosives and Suicide Bombers in March. Meanwhile, 
ASEAN and the Australian Agency for International Development (Aus-
AID) jointly organized the Foundation Course for Senior Offi cials in the 
Theory of Counter-Terrorism Recognition and Multilateral Collaboration 
in Jakarta in 2004.
Signifi cantly, it was not until the tenth ASEAN Summit held in Laos in 
2004 that a comprehensive plan was put in place to streamline the group-
ing’s efforts to achieve an integrated community comprising the security, 
economic, and sociocultural spheres—all addressing issues of transnational 
crime between 2005–10. In the Vientiane Action Program (VAP), ASEAN 
sought to establish a Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement (MLAA) in 
criminal matters relating to terrorism, a Convention on Counter-Terrorism, 
as well as an ASEAN Extradition Treaty. The Convention on Counter-
Terrorism was to be established under the joint drafting group between the 
ASEAN Senior Offi cials Meeting (SOM) and the SOM on Transnational 
Crime (SOMTC).12 The extradition treaty was established under the pur-
view of the ASEAN Senior Law Offi cials Meeting (ASLOM). The MLAA, 
calling for comprehensive legal help for the member countries’ judiciaries, 
was signed by all member states in November 2004. Yet, under Article 3, 
Section 1(f), the agreement states that the requested party shall refuse as-
sistance if, in its opinion “the provision of assistance would affect the sov-
ereignty, security . . . or essential interests of the Requested Party.”13 This 
rather undermines the transnational effectiveness of the agreement.
At the same time, ASEAN has displayed some unity of purpose in com-
bating terrorism through cooperation with countries outside the region. The 
ASEAN-U.S. Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International 
11. ASEAN, Association of Southeast Asian Nations: Annual Report 2003–2004 (Jakarta: 
ASEAN Secretariat, 2004), pp. 12–13.
12. ASEAN, Vientiane Action Program, ibid., pp. 30–31.
13. ASEAN, Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement, ibid., p. 8.
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Terrorism, signed in August 2002, committed both parties to a number of 
initiatives. These included the development of effective counter-terrorism 
policies; legal, regulatory, and administrative counter-terrorism regimes; en-
hanced liaison among law enforcement agencies; strengthened capacity ef-
forts through training and education; consultations among offi cials, analysts, 
and fi eld operators, as well as joint operations; and cooperation in trans-
portation and border and immigration control.14 While this declaration ar-
ticulates ASEAN’s commitment to fi ght terrorism in tandem with the U.S., 
ASEAN offi cials took the view that such activity ensured the association’s 
own security and did not necessarily happen at the behest of the U.S. This 
position was clarifi ed with the U.S.-proposed Regional Maritime Security 
Initiative for the waterways of the Malacca Strait in early 2004. Here, the 
U.S. military proposed to interdict vessels suspected of carrying pirates or 
terrorists. The proposal received support only from Singapore, while Indo-
nesia and Malaysia staunchly opposed the measure. The latter argued that 
primary responsibility for such intrusive counter-terrorism measures should 
belong to the littoral countries of the strait. Singapore, Malaysia, and In-
donesia instead agreed to “coordinated patrols”—not joint patrols—in the 
strait, backed by intelligence and training cooperation with the U.S.15
ASEAN’s foremost institutional mechanism for countering terrorism re-
mains therefore the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime 
(AMMTC)—essentially an intergovernmental arrangement. The AMMTC 
is instrumentally headed by the ministers of home affairs and forms the core 
of ASEAN counter-terrorism cooperation. Following the September 11 at-
tacks, the AMMTC held the Special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Terror-
ism in May 2002 in Kuala Lumpur. ASEAN leaders updated their terrorist 
work plan, welcoming efforts by member states like Singapore and Malay-
sia to provide training in the areas of intelligence procurement and psy-
chological operations and psychological warfare vis-à-vis counter-terrorism. 
The SOM, the subsidiary body of the AMMTC, subsequently held annual 
meetings in Hanoi, in 2003, and Bandar Seri Begawan, Malaysia, in 2004, 
which discussed and reviewed ongoing cooperation and activities in com-
bating transnational crime and terrorism.16
14. ASEAN-United States of America Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat Inter-
national Terrorism, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, August 1, 2002, <http://www.aseansec.org/ 
7424.htm>.
15. Amitav Acharya, Terrorism and Security in Asia: Redefi ning Regional Order? Working 
Paper, no. 113 (Perth: Asia Research Center, 2004), p. 12.
16. See ASEAN, Annual Report 2003–2004, p. 13; ASEAN, Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations Annual Report 2004–2005: Building the ASEAN Community (Jakarta: ASEAN Sec-
retariat, 2005), p. 17.
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Signifi cantly, ASEAN reached a landmark convention on counter-
t errorism at the 2007 annual summit in the Philippines. In January in 
Cebu, ASEAN leaders signed a legally binding counter-terror agreement 
that requires ratifi cation through national legislation. The convention on 
counter-terrorism guides regional efforts to prevent terrorism and en-
hance cooperation among the various regional law enforcement authori-
ties. ASEAN member states are legally required to adhere to the key 
international conventions established since the 1970s that are designed to 
thwart acts of terrorism. The conventions make it a crime to seize aircraft, 
infl ict damage upon fi xed platforms on the continental shelf, disrupt mari-
time navigation, take hostages, carry out or fi nance terrorist bombings, 
and conduct nuclear terrorism. At the operational level, the convention re-
quires the sharing of early-warning information with member states on 
terrorist movements. It also requires signatories to strengthen their capa-
bility and readiness in dealing with chemical, biological, radiological, and 
nuclear (known as CBRN) methods of terrorism. Meanwhile, the agree-
ment calls for a regional counter-terrorism database to be established with 
ASEAN oversight.
However, the convention’s effectiveness remains dependent upon each 
member’s willingness to cooperate. The ASEAN Convention on Counter-
Terrorism reiterates ASEAN norms of non-interference. Article 3 more-
over contains an impediment to regional cooperation. It states, “The Parties 
shall carry out their obligations under this Convention in a manner con-
sistent with the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity of 
States and that of non-interference in the internal affairs of other Parties.”17 
The convention does not apply in cases where a terrorist offense is com-
mitted within the territorial domain of another party, which hinders the 
monitoring of known terrorist operations within another state. Also under 
Article 22 of the convention a party can withdraw from the agreement vol-
untarily “at any time after the date of the entry into force of this Conven-
tion for that Party.”18 Interestingly, Indonesia and six other ASEAN member 
states will hold discussions with Australia regarding the practical applica-
tion of the convention.
Signifi cantly, the development of a regional intelligence database on 
counter-terrorism will be affected by the degree of coordination among 
national agencies in various member states. In some Southeast Asian coun-
tries, the September 11 attacks have not improved the information fl ow be-
tween security and intelligence agencies. Instead ASEAN states rely upon 
information supplied by external partners including the U.S. and Australia.
17. ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism, Cebu, Philippines, January 13, 2007, <http://
www.aseansec.org/19250.htm>.
18. Ibid.
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ASEAN declarations and meetings on terrorism refl ect unity at the level 
of offi cial discourse. Indeed, ASEAN has taken steps to enhance its mem-
bers’ level of state capacity in countering terrorism. It has also established 
a legally binding framework for cooperation. Yet, in practice, ASEAN plans 
for counter-terrorism cooperation lack effective application. Given this re-
ality, as we shall show, regional political elites continue to uphold norms 
of non-interference at the state and sub-regional levels that inhibit prog-
ress toward deeper security cooperation.
Cooperation at the Sub-regional Level
The extent to which norm building in a security community deepens secu-
rity cooperation and a sense of “we-ness” can also be measured in terms of 
counter-terrorism cooperation at the sub-regional level. Sub-regional co-
operation in Southeast Asia has taken the form of intelligence and infor-
mation exchanges. This has led to a number of high profi le arrests.
Given the importance of the intelligence function in counter-terrorist 
policies, cooperation has been established under a trilateral political frame-
work among Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines under the Agreement 
on Information Exchange and Establishment of Communication Proce-
dures agreed to in Kuala Lumpur in May 2002. Cambodia and Thailand 
acceded to the agreement in July and November, while Brunei signed it in 
late 2003. The agreement broadly calls for greater intelligence sharing, joint 
anti-terrorism exercises, and combined operations to hunt suspected ter-
rorists, but implicitly focuses on the geographical area bordering Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and the Philippines, where militants have been known to oper-
ate. It remains unclear whether the pact enhances the powers of individual 
nations to clamp down on transnational terrorists along the Thai/Malay, 
Thai/Malay/Philippine, and Thai/Myanmar borders, or if it compels a na-
tion to act on information provided to it about suspects or possible terror-
ist activities.
Nevertheless, sub-regional information exchanges between some intel-
ligence and law enforcement agencies have been successful in helping to 
capture key Islamic militants throughout Southeast Asia. While Singapore 
dismantled local JI cells in 2001, Arifi n bin Ali, Singapore’s JI cell leader 
and a former instructor to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in 
the southern Philippines, escaped the security net and plotted the further 
bombing of fi ve embassies in Bangkok before his arrest by Thai authorities. 
Thai authorities arrested bin Ali in May 2003 as a result of a tip-off  from 
Singapore’s national intelligence agencies.19 Similarly, another JI operative, 
19. Shawn W. Crispin, “Thailand––Falling in Step,” Far Eastern Economic Review, June 
26, 2003, p. 19.
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Mas Selamat Kastari, slipped the Singaporean government’s security net in 
2001 following a failed plan to crash hijacked planes into the island-state’s 
Changi International Airport. Singapore’s intelligence services were able 
to inform Indonesian authorities of Kastari’s whereabouts in Riau Province 
on Sumatra where Indonesian authorities apprehended the JI operative. 
Kastari was repatriated to Singapore where, as of early 2008, he managed 
an escape from prison and remains at large.20 Furthermore, a JI bombmaker 
linked to the fi rst Bali bombings, Fathur Rohman Al-Ghozi, was arrested 
in early 2002 in Manila as a result of joint Philippine-Singaporean intelli-
gence cooperation.21 These arrests have led one political commentator to 
note that despite the limited capacity of some Southeast Asian governments 
to handle internal matters, “ASEAN authorities are doing something right” 
in combating regional terrorism.22
The most signifi cant strike against JI occurred when Southeast Asia’s 
most wanted man and formerly the world’s third most wanted terrorist 
(behind Ayman al-Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden), Riduan “Hambali” 
Isamuddin, was captured in Bangkok in August 2003 as a result of a joint 
U.S.-Thai operation. He was dubbed by U.S. authorities as Southeast Asia’s 
tier-1 terror operative following his connection to at least 33 bombings in 
Indonesia, including Bali in 2002 and the Marriott Jakarta hotel bombing 
in 2003, a political assassination in Malaysia, and various bombings in the 
Philippines. Hambali was apprehended following an intensive manhunt 
led by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) when intelligence offi -
cers traced his location to the Thai city of Ayutthaya and tipped off  Thai 
authorities to arrest him.23
Signifi cantly, the Hambali case demonstrated that ASEAN states required 
external assistance to identify and address the threat of regional terrorism. 
Similarly, in Singapore, Southeast Asia’s most tightly controlled city-state, 
authorities foiled a reported plot where a local JI cell planned to bomb 
Western embassies in 2001, including the U.S. and Israeli embassies and the 
Australian and U.K. High Commissions. Yet, again, it was not Singapore’s 
security apparatus, the Internal Security Department (ISD), that foiled the 
20. Azhar Ghani, “Singapore Militant on the Loose for Five Months Before Re-Arrest,” 
Straits Times, February 11, 2006.
21. Government of Singapore, Ministry of Home Affairs, Special ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting on Terrorism, Kuala Lumpur––Remark by Mr. Wong Kan Seng, Minister for Home 
Affairs, 21 May 02, <http://www.mha.gov.sg>, accessed September 10, 2006.
22. Dini Djalal, “Asia’s Intelligence Gap,” Foreign Policy 135:2 (March/April 2003), pp. 
84–85.
23. Raymond Bonner and Seth Mydans, “An Intensive Hunt Led to a Terror Suspect and, 
Offi cials Hope, Details of Future Plots,” New York Times, August 16, 2003, p. 3.
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plot but action resulting from a tip-off  from Britain’s MI6.24 This informa-
tion followed the discovery by U.S. forces in Afghanistan of a video from 
JI sent to Kabul with surveillance footage of the embassies as part of a 
funding application.25
Just as ASEAN states require external assistance to police transnational 
terrorism, Southeast Asian security services are also vulnerable to inter-
agency rivalry and lack of coordination, which limit successful implemen-
tation of sub-regional counter-terror policies. This critically undermines a 
shared ability to collect and analyze intelligence on internal security mat-
ters like terrorism. There has been a long-standing rivalry between Indo-
nesia’s State Intelligence Agency, Badan Intelijen Negara (BIN), and the 
Indonesian National Police, Polisi Republic Indonesia (POLRI), since their 
separation in 1999. For Indonesia’s security services, BIN produces secu-
rity assessments that determine the level and scope of potential threats. 
These data provide POLRI with the appropriate security-risk context to 
investigate and conduct arrests.26 Indonesia’s national military commander, 
Endriartono Sutarto, stressed that the Armed Forces of Indonesia, Ten-
tara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) would not involve its members in police 
duties to prevent or handle acts of terrorism. He argued that if  police ca-
pabilities were lacking then police capabilities should be improved. This 
inter-service rivalry between intelligence and the national police has under-
mined responses to terrorism in Indonesia, with POLRI having to assess 
its own intelligence. In one instance, the national police force intercepted 
an email from the suicide bomber Asmar Latin Sani to another JI member 
regarding a suicide operation that later turned out to be preparations for 
the Marriott hotel bombings. In Bali, police had fi les on members of the 
JI cell six months prior to the bombings in October 2002 but were not pro-
vided with a threat assessment warranting arrests. Signifi cantly, this lack 
of coordination puts Indonesia’s national police in a position where it is 
more inclined to believe foreign intelligence reports than TNI intelligence 
reports, particularly when the military traditionally has not been forth-
coming in information sharing with the police.27
24.  “Al-Qa’eda Plot to Bomb U.S. Ships Is Foiled by MI6,” Daily Telegraph, January 13, 
2002.
25. David Martin Jones and Michael Smith, “The Perils of Hyper-Vigilance: The War on 
Terrorism and the Surveillance State in South-East Asia,” Intelligence and National Security 
17:4 (Winter 2002), p. 41.
26. Maria Ressa, “Rivalry Threatens Indonesia’s Intelligence Network,” CNN, World, 
February 25, 2004.
27.  “Indonesian General Comments on Role of Intelligence in Fight Against Terrorism,” 
BBC, Monitoring Asia Pacifi c, August 28, 2003.
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Contrary to the rhetorical commitment at a regional level, the capture of 
key militants has occurred largely as a result of bilateral cooperation on an 
ad hoc basis. Singapore has been the most active Southeast Asian state lead-
ing counter-terrorism efforts. Indeed, as we have shown, Western states 
have also proved crucial. To help in security community building, there ex-
ists only a minimal network of counter-terrorism cooperation in the fi eld of 
intelligence. Political elites continue to maintain their respect for state sover-
eignty despite the transnational nature of regional terrorism. Whereas the 
sub-regional linkages have been limited, the impact of ASEAN initiatives in 
counter-terrorism at the state level needs consideration. Let us look briefl y at 
leading ASEAN states’ responses to the emergence of transnational terror.
The Implication of State Counter-Terror 
Policy on ASEAN Community Building
An examination of state counter-terrorism responses of the core ASEAN 
countries is needed to discern the existence of multilateral security coopera-
tion and a sense of “we-ness” in Southeast Asia. This will allow us to de-
termine the extent to which ASEAN community building initiatives have 
engendered denser networks of security cooperation at the state level. This 
section briefl y assesses the counter-terror policy responses of Indonesia, 
the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore.
Indonesia
Indonesia, home to the world’s largest Muslim population, was quick to con-
demn the September 11 attacks. Former President Megawati Sukar no putri 
expressed Indonesia’s solidarity with President George W. Bush and joined 
him in condemning the attacks. Megawati supported plans to organize a co-
alition to respond to the new threat and was subsequently awarded an exclu-
sive bilateral aid package from the U.S. Congress worth $130 million. Bush 
also promised fi nancial assistance to train the police and rebuild infra-
structure in confl ict-ridden areas on the condition that past human rights 
violations on the part of the Indonesian military should be addressed.
Nevertheless, between 2001–04, Megawati equivocated over Indonesia’s 
political commitment to fi ghting international terrorism, in order to ap-
pease domestic political constituencies. Following the military invasion of 
Afghanistan, she urged Washington to cease hostilities during the Islamic 
holy month of Ramadan, asserting that such action would “weaken the 
global coalition to war on terrorism.”28 The former president’s change of 
28. Jay Solomon, “Megawati Warns U.S. of Rift––Indonesian President Urges Stop to 
Fighting During Ramadan––Continuation of Military Action ‘Will Weaken’ Global Coali-
tion Against Terrorism,” Wall Street Journal Asia, November 2, 2001, p. 3.
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heart stemmed from popular criticism in Indonesia over the war.29 As the 
leader of a weak coalition government, Megawati was dependent on the sup-
port of Islamic parties and so was unwilling to align her government too 
closely with the U.S. Megawati was also unwilling to act on information pro-
vided by Malaysian authorities regarding a cache of bomb-making mate-
rial, which remains unfound, belonging to Malaysian militants, on the island 
of Batam, out of fear of an Islamic backlash. A crackdown on domestic 
Islamic militant groups would have galvanized civil unrest and lost her sup-
port among Muslim political parties, which she needed to secure another 
term in the 2004 presidential election.30
What particularly animated the Indonesian response was the Bali bomb-
ings, which forced Indonesia to confront the threat of  home grown ter-
rorism that had previously been ignored. Immediately after the bombings, 
a warrant was issued for JI spiritual leader Abu Bakar Bashir’s arrest on 
the grounds that he had received fi nancial support from Osama bin Laden 
to procure three tons of explosives. Indonesia took active steps to appre-
hend the perpetrators of the bombings. Amrozi, the JI member who built 
the Bali bombs, was arrested on November 7, 2002. Indonesian police ar-
rested Imam Samudra, the mastermind of the bombings and Hambali’s 
key deputy, on November 21. Ali Gufron (alias Mukhlas), a key JI opera-
tive in Indonesia and older brother to Amrozi, was arrested in Klaten, Cen-
tral Java, on November 4. Ali Imron, the younger brother of Amrozi and 
Mukhlas and the fi eld coordinator of the bombings, was arrested on Janu-
ary 14, 2003.
Signifi cantly, Indonesian police forces could not have apprehended the 
JI Bali cell without cooperation with Australian law enforcement. Indo-
nesia’s police forces lacked the technical capability as well as the forensic 
skills and experience needed to fi nd the perpetrators in the aftermath of 
the fi rst Bali bombings. When the Indonesian police apprehended 11 key 
suspects in a series of  raids across Central Java, the Australian Federal 
Police (AFP) provided technical support in tracking the suspects; AFP of-
fi cers were even on hand to assist during the arrests.31 Meanwhile Austra-
lian and U.S. signals intelligence (SIGINT) organizations, respectively the 
Defense Signals Directorate (DSD) and the National Security Agency 
(NSA), played a central role in tracking the mobile phones used by the JI 
29. David Capie, “Between a Hegemon and a Hard Place: The ‘War on Terror’ and South-
east Asian-U.S. Relations,” Pacifi c Review 17:2 (June 2004), p. 228.
30. Ibid.
31. Mark Baker, “Police on the Diplomatic Beat in Asia,” Age, September 13, 2003, p. 5; 
Don Greenlees, “AFP Help in Swoop on 11 Suspects,” Australian, December 5, 2002, p. 7.
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operatives.32 Following the second Bali bombing on October 1, 2005, the 
AFP assisted in bomb data analysis and victim identifi cation.33
Beyond cooperating over the Bali bombings, Australia and Indonesia 
jointly established the Jakarta Center for Law Enforcement Cooperation 
(JCLEC) in July 2004, which focuses on training activities in counter-
terrorism, including tracking and interception of terrorists, forensics, crime 
scene investigation, fi nancial investigation, and threat assessments. The 
Australia-Indonesia security treaty signed in 2006 allows members of the 
Special Air Service Regiment (SASR), the Australian special forces, to con-
duct joint counter-hijack and hostage rescue exercises with Indonesia’s Army 
Special Force Command, Kommando Pasukan Khusus (KOPASSUS).34 
However, the release of JI spiritual leader Abu Bakar Bashir in mid-2006 
was met with criticism by the Australian government in a letter to Presi-
dent Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono that pointedly reminded him of Bashir’s 
connection to the fi rst Bali bombings.35
At the same time, Indonesia has also engaged in closer bilateral cooper-
ation with the U.S. to build its counter-terrorism capabilities. The U.S. 
provides assistance to police and security offi cials, prosecutors, legislators, 
immigration offi cials, and banking regulators. The U.S. has implemented 
counter-terrorism capacity building programs including funding for the es-
tablishment of a national police counter-terrorist unit, counter-terrorism 
training for police and security offi cials, and fi nancial intelligence training 
to enhance anti-money laundering operations and train counter-intelligence 
analysts. Indeed, the Indonesian police’s counter-terrorist unit, Detach-
ment 88, was established with U.S. funding and trained by retired offi cers 
of the U.S. Secret Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and CIA.36 
Crucially, the elite unit apprehended key JI military leader Abu Dujana in 
June 2007. U.S. counter-terrorism assistance has also extended to the In-
donesian military. The U.S. Pacifi c Command (USPACOM) has reestab-
lished limited ties with the TNI, sponsoring conferences on civil-military 
relations, democratic institutions, and non-lethal training (all components 
of the U.S. International Military and Education Training program).
Indonesia’s counter-terror responses have primarily been infl uenced by 
domestic politics, with former President Megawati shifting Indonesia’s com-
mitment on the basis of Muslim popular support in the global war against 
32. Martin Chulov, “A Win Against Terror,” Australian, October 7, 2006, pp. 17, 22.
33. Tracy Sutherland, “Police Arrive to Help Track Down Network,” Australian Financial 
Review, October 3, 2005, p. 8.
34. Mark Dodd, “SAS to Train with Indonesians,” Australian, February 2, 2007, p. 2.
35. Stephen Fitzpatrick and Patrick Walters, “Bali Was God’s Will: Bashir,” ibid., June 16, 
2006, p. 1.
36. Bruce Vaughn, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, updated February 7 (Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Research Service, 2005), p. 18.
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terrorism. Although President Yudhoyono, Megawati’s successor, has dem-
onstrated a stronger commitment to fi ghting terrorism, he has not trans-
formed Indonesia’s approach to ensuring regional security. The ASEAN 
norm of  non-interference limited Indonesia from engaging with other 
South east Asian states in signifi cant counter-terrorism cooperation. In-
stead, bilateral cooperation with Western states like Australia and the U.S. 
has developed Indonesia’s counter-terrorist capabilities.
The Philippines
The Philippines is another key theater in the fi ght against terrorism in 
Southeast Asia. Following the September 11 attacks, President Gloria 
Macapagal-Arroyo emerged as Southeast Asia’s most vocal supporter of 
the U.S.-led anti-terrorism campaign. After meeting Bush and pledging her 
support, Arroyo was awarded over $4 billion in trade deals and aid pack-
ages. Of that amount, nearly $100 million was designated for the Armed 
Forces of  the Philippines, including the procurement of  a C-130 mili-
tary transport plane; helicopters; a patrol boat; armored personnel carriers; 
30,000 M-16 rifl es; and anti-terrorism training. Arroyo’s cordial relation-
ship with the U.S., however, galvanized resentment from nationalist par-
ties, which suspected a return of U.S. colonialism in the Philippines.
As with Indonesia, but with somewhat different political motives, Arroyo’s 
support for the American-led campaign against terrorism served a domes-
tic political agenda. Arroyo wanted to restore a close alliance and security 
relationship with Washington following the decline in bilateral relations 
after the American withdrawal from its military facilities at Subic Bay Naval 
Base and Clark Air Force Base in 1991 at the behest of the Philippines.37 
Second, and more important, U.S. military support to the Philippine armed 
forces served a political purpose, fostering ties between the Arroyo admin-
istration and the military, a factor always important in Philippine politics 
given the country’s history of coups d’état. Arroyo wanted to end the func-
tion of the Philippines as a base for international terrorist organizations 
and realized that only U.S. military support could give the Philippine mili-
tary equipment and training to conduct effective counter-terrorist opera-
tions in the southern islands where most of the insurgents operate.38
Indeed, the U.S. military deployed approximately 1,200 personnel, includ-
ing 150 Special Forces soldiers, to the southern Philippines between Janu-
ary and July 2002, to assist in counter-terrorism operations against the 
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG, or Bearer of the Sword). The exercises, dubbed 
37. Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror (London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2003), p. 203.
38. Ibid., p. 211.
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“Balikatan” (shoulder to shoulder), resulted in a signifi cant reduction of 
Abu Sayyaf  strength on the island of  Basilan. The Philippine military’s 
counter-terrorist operations were effective as a result of U.S. aid for intelli-
gence gathering, state-of-the-art equipment, and operational planning. The 
U.S. has also developed the Philippine army’s counter-terrorism capacity 
over the long-term by training two Light Reaction Companies (LRC) and 
eight light infantry battalions in counter-terrorism; strengthening opera-
tional and intelligence capabilities for the Southern Command; and train-
ing Philippine Air Force (PAP) helicopter crews in night fl ying.39 Similarly, 
members of  the Australian SAS and intelligence offi cers of  the Austra-
lian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) have been present since 2005 in the 
Philippines, cooperating with U.S. and local forces to fi nd suspects Umar 
Patek and Dulmatin, the latter responsible for the October 1, 2005, Bali 
bombing.40
The Philippine army’s increased role in counter-terrorism has led to com-
plications of jurisdictional overlap with law enforcement agencies, which 
also conduct counter-terrorism operations.41 At the same time, Philippine 
counter-terrorism responses have been hindered by Arroyo’s inability to 
enact anti-terrorism legislation. This is attributed to poor communication 
between Philippine law enforcement agencies and the Anti-Money Laun-
dering Council (AMLC), which has stymied effective implementation of 
the Anti-Money Laundering Act.42
President Arroyo used the rhetoric of the Global War on Terrorism to 
establish rapprochement between the Philippines and the U.S. after a lull in 
their relations spanning almost a decade. In so doing, she won international 
backing to confront Islamic extremists in the south, traditionally seen as 
an internal domestic problem. The Philippine military was given much-
needed military hardware and counter-terrorist training, helping to de-
velop its capabilities over the long term. Still, no denser counter-terrorism 
cooperation has been generated between the Philippines and neighboring 
states via ASEAN. Like Indonesia, the Philippines has enhanced bilateral 
39. Renato Cruz de Castro, “Addressing International Terrorism in Southeast Asia: A 
Matter of Strategic or Functional Approach?” Contemporary Southeast Asia 26:2 (August 
2004), p. 201.
40. Greg Sheridan, “SAS in Hunt for Asia’s Terrorists,” Australian, October 14, 2006, 
pp. 1, 6; Lincoln Wright, “Bali Horror SAS Hunts Bomb Gang,” Sunday Mail, October 9, 
2005, p. 15.
41. Carolina G. Hernandez, Fighting Terrorism on the Southeast Asian Front, Asia Pro-
gram Special Report, no. 112 (Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Schol-
ars, 2003), p. 19.
42. David Garcia, “U.S. Security Policy and Counter-Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” 
UNISCI Discussion Papers 2:5 (May 2004), p. 8.
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cooperation with the U.S. and Australia to develop its military capacity to 
conduct counter-terrorism operations.
Thailand
Thailand, like Indonesia and the Philippines, has a long-standing domes-
tic problem with Islamic extremists, who operate in Thailand’s southern 
provinces. JI operatives have also targeted Bangkok, and following the Sep-
tember 11 attacks, Thailand pledged its support in the Global War on Ter-
rorism. Thailand subsequently allowed its U-Tapao Air Base to be used by 
the U.S. Air Force as a logistical staging area for air combat operations 
into Afghanistan. The Thai government also sent an engineering unit to 
Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Free-
dom. However, it was not until the 2003 capture in Thailand of Riduan 
“Hambali” Isamuddin, Southeast Asia’s most wanted terrorist, that then-
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra offi cially acknowledged the threat em-
anating from regional terrorism.
Regional political commentators have highlighted the fact that domestic 
political considerations largely drove Thaksin’s support for the international 
campaign against terrorism.43 Thaksin’s stance was designed to “preempt” 
potential terrorist attacks in Thailand like those in Indonesia and the Phil-
ippines. An incident like Bali on Thai soil would devastate Thailand’s 
tourism industry, which accounts for more than 7% of GDP. More impor-
tant, Thaksin was concerned with enhancing his regional leadership creden-
tials and therefore needed to appear strong on the war on terrorism. This 
ambition led to a government crackdown on Islamic militants in southern 
Thailand that claimed 1,700 lives over two years.44 Thaksin’s heavy-handed 
response was one reason behind the recent military coup led by General 
Sonthi Boonyaratglin of Thailand’s southern command, the country’s fi rst 
Muslim commander in chief  of the army. The coup also stemmed from 
military disapproval of the tactics applied by the Thai government in the 
southern provinces. Thaksin used anti-terror rhetoric to strengthen his re-
gional standing as a political fi gure in Southeast Asia. Admittedly, the most 
important political objective for Thaksin was to bandwagon with the U.S. 
in the war to gain strategic assets and reap concessions like the U.S.-Thai 
free trade agreement.
Consequently, Thailand and the U.S. have established close counter-
terrorism cooperation through the joint Counter Terrorism Intelligence 
43. Thitinan Pongsudhirak, “Behind Thaksin’s War on Terror,” Far Eastern Economic Re-
view, September 25, 2003, p. 29.
44. Michael Sheridan, “Thais Change Track on Islamists,” Australian, September 25, 
2006, p. 12.
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Center (CTIC), which was established in 2001 to enhance coordination 
among Thailand’s security services.45 The U.S. CIA assigns 20 agents to 
the center and shares the facility and information with Thai counterparts 
on a daily basis. There are plans to open a diplomatic mission in the south-
ern region, which would serve as a forward post for U.S. agents collecting 
intelligence.
U.S.-Thailand counter-terrorism cooperation is most pronounced in 
joint military exercises like Known Warrior and Cobra Gold. Cobra Gold is 
a joint military exercise designed to develop the capabilities of the Royal 
Thai Armed Forces to respond to potential threats to national security. 
Known Warrior focuses exclusively on building the Thai military’s counter-
terrorist capability, with particular emphasis on intelligence coordination, 
fi eld exercises, and anti-terrorist special warfare tactics. Counter-terrorism 
training since September 11 has added the component of chemical and bi-
ological warfare.
Although Thaksin avowedly saw material benefi ts deriving from his sup-
port of the U.S. campaign, notably counter-terrorist training for the Thai 
military, the counter-terror policies have not engendered denser networks 
of cooperation between Thailand and neighboring Southeast Asian states. 
The continued acceptance of ASEAN norms of non-interference placed 
Thailand, like Indonesia and the Philippines, in a position where it has 
turned to the U.S. for assistance in intelligence assessment and counter-
terrorism training, key areas for establishing effective counter-terrorism 
capabilities.
Malaysia
Malaysia is another Southeast Asian state with a dominant Muslim major-
ity that has conditionally supported the Global War on Terrorism. Former 
Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad openly criticized Islamic 
terrorists after the September 11 attacks. In a show of  appreciation for 
Malaysia’s support, President Bush invited Mahathir to Washington in 
mid-May 2002, and the two governments signed a Memorandum of Un-
derstanding (MoU) on counter-terrorism. Malaysia provided “nuts-and-
bolts” support for U.S. military operations in Afghanistan by allowing 
overfl ight clearance during Operation Enduring Freedom.46 The Malay-
sian government has detained over 90 suspected terrorists, including mem-
bers from JI and the Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM, Malaysian 
Mujahidin Movement), an extremist group advocating a pan-regional 
45. See Vaughn, Terrorism, p. 27.
46. See Garcia, U.S. Security Policy, p. 8.
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Islamic state encompassing Malaysia, Indonesia, and the southern Philip-
pines. Following Mahathir’s resignation at the end of 2003, Malaysia’s new 
Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi pledged continuing support for 
the war against terrorism.
Malaysia’s political leaders, as elsewhere in Southeast Asia, have used 
the war on terrorism to suppress domestic opposition. Mahathir, prior to 
stepping down in 2004, used the colonial era Internal Security Act (ISA) 
to detain 10 people reportedly suspected of having links to the KMM. Of 
them, eight were members of the opposition Partai Islam SeMalaysia (Is-
lamic Party of Malaysia, PAS), which seeks to establish an Islamic state 
ruled by shari’a (Islamic law). These included Nik Abdul Aziz, the son of 
PAS leader Datuk Seri Nik Aziz, the premier of the state of Kelantan. Ma-
hathir, like President Arroyo in the Philippines, also used the war on ter-
rorism to reestablish relations with the U.S., which had declined throughout 
the 1990s.
While the U.S. and Malaysia have no military arrangement dealing with 
counter-terrorism, law enforcement and intelligence cooperation have in-
creased since September 11. American law enforcement personnel were given 
access to a Malaysian citizen being detained under the ISA, namely, Zaca-
rias Moussaoui, known as the “twentieth hijacker.”47 Malaysia and the U.S. 
also co-hosted the ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-sessional Meeting on 
Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime in Sabah, which included all 
10 Southeast Asian nations.
Malaysian leaders have used the war on terrorism to advance their own 
domestic political agenda. In Malaysian politics, Abdullah Badawi’s ruling 
United Malays National Organization (UMNO) party has traditionally 
viewed the PAS as a threat to its authority. Moreover, despite ASEAN-
level counter-terrorism initiatives, Malaysia, like Indonesia, the Philippines, 
and Thailand, has not established any collaborative working relationship 
with neighboring Southeast Asian states in countering regional terror-
ism. Indeed, the activities of the Pattani United Liberation Organization48 
(PULO) (and similar groups) have intensifi ed since 2003 and increased 
Thailand-Malaysia bilateral tensions. And inter-ASEAN cooperation has 
not rectifi ed problems along the Thai-Malay border. Malaysia’s adher-
ence to ASEAN norms of non-interference limits the possibility of greater 
cooperation.
47. See Capie, Between a Hegemon, p. 233.
48. PULO is a separatist movement based in southern Thailand comprising predomi-
nantly ethnic Malays. PULO’s two armed factions are fi ghting the government of Thailand to 
resurrect the former territories of the Malay kingdom of Pattani.
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Singapore
Of all the Southeast Asian states that have supported the war on terror-
ism, Singapore has been the U.S.’s staunchest ally. After the September 11 
terrorist attacks, Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew pledged Singapore’s sup-
port for the U.S.-led war on terrorism. Lee reiterated Southeast Asia’s stra-
tegic importance in the fi ght against international terrorism, urging regional 
states to deny Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda network a safe haven as its 
members fl ed Afghanistan. Singapore’s commitment to the war on terror-
ism was most pronounced when it swiftly uprooted local terrorist cells in 
December 2001, with intelligence operatives detaining over 16 JI members, 
eight of whom reportedly trained in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. Sin-
gapore has also taken steps to counter terrorism on the fi nancial front, 
with the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) calling on banks to in-
stitute rigorous anti-laundering procedures.
Singapore’s support for the U.S. war on terrorism, as in Thailand, is 
meant to maintain investor confi dence in the city-state. Indeed, Singapore’s 
externally oriented economy relies heavily on foreign direct investment, 
which would recede if  security concerns like terrorism became an issue. As 
Abuza notes, “Political stability and physical security tend to be the pri-
mary reasons multinational corporations base their regional headquarters 
in Singapore.”49 In a fi nancial risk assessment report on Singapore that 
looks at the impact of terrorism, the city-state received an overall score of 
12 out of 100, indicating a moderate level of risk to investors.50
Singapore’s counter-terrorism responses involved increasingly close co-
operation with the U.S. The USPACOM Joint Intelligence Center regu-
larly shares information with Singapore’s Joint Counter-Terrorism Center, 
where U.S. SIGINT is exchanged for Singaporean human intelligence 
(HUMINT).51 Singapore has signed on to a container security initiative 
headed by the U.S. Customs Service that allows U.S. Customs offi cials to be 
stationed at Singapore’s ports, where they help inspect containers to pre-
vent terrorists from smuggling weapons of mass destruction into containers 
bound for the U.S.52 Port operators and shipping companies, however, have 
expressed concern that inspection can lead to costly delays.53
Singapore is Southeast Asia’s fi nancial hub, and any terrorist attack 
on the city-state would devastate its economy and subsequently hurt its 
49. See Abuza, Militant Islam, p. 220.
50.  “Singapore Risk: Alert––Terrorism Threat?” Economist Intelligence Unit, September 
9, 2003, p. 30.
51. See Garcia, U.S. Security Policy, p. 10.
52. Wayne Arnold, “Dockside, the War on Terrorism May Hone Rivalry,” New York 
Times, August 13, 2002, p. 1.
53. Ibid.
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national security. Singapore, like Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, and 
Malaysia, has not engaged in broader counter-terrorism cooperation with 
neighboring Southeast Asian states, except when targeting JI operatives 
who directly threaten its security. Instead, Singapore has established closer 
counter-terrorism cooperation with the U.S., primarily in the areas of law 
enforcement and intelligence. Practical security cooperation in Indonesia, 
the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore has occurred with exter-
nal states like the U.S. and Australia to develop national counter-terrorist 
capabilities. ASEAN norms of non-interference have limited practical se-
curity cooperation.
The ASEAN Security Community 
and Transnational Terrorism
In terms of security community building, Southeast Asia’s counter-terror 
policies need to demonstrate denser ties of security and political coopera-
tion, and an enhanced sense of “we-ness.” In this context, ASEAN norms 
need to transform security policies in a manner that deepens region-wide 
cooperation.
The fi rst criterion requires Southeast Asian counter-terror policies to 
demonstrate deeper levels of intra-regional security and political coopera-
tion. Thus far, the data illustrate that practical counter-terror security co-
operation between Southeast Asian states exists primarily at a bilateral level. 
Southeast Asian states adhere to norms of non-interference that limit the 
density of security cooperation. Interestingly, Singapore has taken more-
active steps to share security intelligence with neighbors, efforts which have 
led to the arrests of key JI fi gures. Meanwhile ASEAN’s limited ability to 
generate dense security transactions leaves member states dependent upon 
external support for counter-terrorism operations.
At the same time, political cooperation through ASEAN has led to a 
number of capacity building workshops on counter-terrorism. These activ-
ities are aimed at facilitating a regional network of cooperation to develop 
each state’s national capabilities, such as investigation and intelligence 
analysis. Again, Singapore has been the most active state in hosting such 
capacity building workshops. For enhanced effectiveness, the ASEAN in-
stitution could facilitate a degree of intra-regional cooperation via Track-
one and Track-two processes.
The second criterion requires that political interaction demonstrate a 
communal sense of “we-ness.” ASEAN’s political commitment to fi ght 
terrorism is illustrated through various declarations on counter-terrorism. 
The organization has established a framework through the convention on 
terrorism that will guide Southeast Asian counter-terror activities toward 
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collective security aims. ASEAN assumes the primary institutional role 
through which regional states engage on terrorism related matters.
However, political cooperation at the ASEAN level is inhibited by the 
association’s code of  conduct. ASEAN norms of  non-interference and 
respect for state sovereignty enable member states to pursue individual, 
not collective, interests. ASEAN documents pertaining to counter-terrorism 
outline the need for information sharing but at the same time reiterate the 
importance of state sovereignty and non-interference. This enables a mem-
ber state to share or act on information selectively, leaving counter-terrorism 
cooperation in an ad hoc form. Despite the transnational nature of threats, 
state level counter-terror responses have been largely bilateral, occurring 
in instances where a country is directly affected by terrorism. Such provi-
sional cooperation limits communal feelings of “we-ness” while curtailing 
the growth of denser networks of security cooperation.
The third criterion requires that norms change policies in a manner that 
improves regional cooperation. ASEAN counter-terrorism initiatives have 
not altered the way member states relate to one another. State responses to 
the war on terror are based not on regional but on domestic political con-
siderations. Political elites are primarily concerned with maintaining polit-
ical legitimacy, domestic constituencies, fi nancial assistance, and/or investor 
confi dence.
Moreover, where practical cooperation occurs to develop national counter-
terrorist capabilities, it is usually with an external non-ASEAN partner like 
the U.S. or Australia. Any successful ASEAN Security Community can be 
expected to alter state behavior that is based upon self-interest toward multi-
lateral cooperation that would deliver absolute gains to a regional commu-
nity. Despite ASEAN claims of generating denser networks of cooperation, 
an emergent pattern of behavior shows ASEAN countries cooperating bi-
laterally with external states. State level responses to terrorism have pri-
marily sought ad hoc support from Australia and the U.S. Signifi cantly, 
both countries have played a seminal role in developing the region’s counter-
terrorist capabilities in the areas of intelligence and law enforcement.
The counter-terrorism test case illustrates that ASEAN displays a rhe-
torical commitment to fi ght terrorism while ASEAN norm compliance has 
limited counter-terrorism cooperation to an intergovernmental process. Na-
tional responses to terrorism have been driven by elites’ domestic political 
agendas. Where bilateral or multilateral cooperation does occur to enhance 
domestic counter-terrorism capabilities, it is with an external partner, usu-
ally the U.S. or Australia. Overall in this policy context, there is little sense 
of unity or “we-ness” whereby counter-terrorism efforts take on a collec-
tive regional response.
In terms of security community building, the institution and norm func-
tions have not facilitated dense networks of cooperation. There is limited 
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evidence to indicate that ASEAN cooperation changed policymakers’ under-
standing of the national interest from relative gains toward common secu-
rity aims. Institutions have had a limited effect on socializing the ASEAN 
states into changing their behavior. Signifi cantly, ASEAN member states, al-
though grouped together by codes of conduct, in fact pursue their interests 
independently. Given this reality, states may form into a regional grouping 
and create institutions, but this does not guarantee a transformation of 
state behavior toward an agreed standard. Thus, institutions and norms may 
generate an ad hoc form of cooperation but are limited in altering state-
centric behavior.
Conclusion
While ASEAN leaders have demonstrated a rhetorical commitment to 
fi ghting terrorism, their declarations, meetings, and process of  extensive 
consultation and consensus building have resulted in little that is con-
crete. In practice, sub-regional and state level cooperation in Southeast 
Asia is bilateral, resulting from ASEAN norms of non-interference. The 
case of  counter-terrorism in Southeast Asia demonstrates that institu-
tions and collective norms have not facilitated practical multilateral secu-
rity cooperation.
The 2001 ASEAN Joint Declaration on Terrorism and various workshops 
on intelligence analysis, post-blast investigations, and airline security all 
demonstrate efforts to coordinate a region-wide counter-terrorism response. 
In terms of security community building, however, ASEAN has had only 
limited success in creating denser networks of security cooperation. ASEAN 
members remain reluctant to cooperate should such cooperation infringe 
upon national sovereignty. Counter-terrorism policies, like that of the Mu-
tual Legal Assistance Agreement, contain clauses stating that member 
states may exercise the right not to cooperate, if  cooperation would affect 
their national security interests. In this context, ASEAN norms of  non-
interference and respect for state sovereignty restrict the ability of South-
east Asian states to engender denser networks of security cooperation.
Practical responses have been both bilateral and extra-regional. At the 
sub-regional level, counter-terrorism cooperation on intelligence and infor-
mation exchanges has led to a number of key JI arrests like that of Ham-
bali. Yet, counter-terrorism cooperation at that level is characterized by a 
bilateral process of security cooperation. The arrests of key JI fi gures have 
been a result of tip-offs from regional countries like Singapore. The region 
lacks a central intelligence sharing database on terrorism. This is not sur-
prising given the overriding infl uence of the principle of non-interference. 
The bilateral nature of security cooperation in Southeast Asia clearly does 
not fulfi ll Garofano’s standard for a denser network.
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At the state level, the most effective response has occurred extra-regionally 
through cooperation with either the U.S. or Australia. National counter-
terrorism responses have also varied across Southeast Asia. Moreover, 
counter-terror responses have not reinforced a sense of community among 
Southeast Asian states, as national counter-terrorism responses have been 
driven by domestic political factors.
ASEAN leaders are hopeful about the prospect for an ASEAN Security 
Community in 2020 that is built upon processes of interstate socialization 
guided by an accepted set of behavioral norms. Such norms foster commu-
nal feelings of unity and “we-ness.” In practice these norms should create 
denser networks of  regional security cooperation. This study of  South-
east Asia’s policy illustrates a regional pattern of behavior defi ned by self-
interest and ad hoc cooperation. The practice of security cooperation in 
Southeast Asia, at least in the context of counter-terror policies, continues 
bilaterally and via partners external to ASEAN. ASEAN’s 40-year anniver-
sary in 2007 undoubtedly inspired refl ections upon its historical progres-
sion and future aspirations in the ASEAN Community 2020. Considering 
Southeast Asia’s enduring pattern of cooperation that is most pronounced 
in its counter-terror strategy, and the importance of  the U.S. in the re-
gional architecture, the prospect for successful community building still 
remains distant.
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